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I. Introduction 
A long-standing hallmark of the scholarship of Lyman 
Johnson and David Millon—both individually and as 
co-authors—has been their consistent focus on the social 
embeddedness of corporate law generally, and fiduciary duties in 
particular. By this I refer to their recognition that corporate law 
and fiduciary duties are deeply rooted in a complex of frameworks 
and institutions—legal, economic, institutional, professional, 
political, social, cultural, and moral—all of which impact one 
another collectively, and affect how people concretely behave and 
relate to one another in the marketplace.   
There are several ways in which this recognition has 
manifested itself in their work on corporate fiduciary duties. 
Consistent with the traditional emphasis on how robust and 
affirmative fiduciary duties sustain the corporate form—both as a 
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means of establishing and preserving the trust and confidence 
that are vital to virtually any business organization, and by 
protecting vulnerable parties—Johnson and Millon have long 
remained quite critical of the contractual conception of the 
business corporation and the narrow focus on shareholders’ 
interests often associated with this theoretical orientation.1 
Stated in fiduciary terminology, the issue of corporate purpose 
boils down to the question: “loyalty to whom?”2 In response to 
that question, Johnson and Millon have long argued for a more 
embracing conception of corporate purpose and fiduciary loyalty 
that preserves some capacity for corporate decision-makers to 
show regard for the interests of others—be they employees, 
creditors, commercial counterparties, local communities, or 
society in general. Recognition of the social embeddedness of 
corporate law and fiduciary duties likewise animates their 
holistic exploration of a wide range of actors—both private and 
public—who all collectively impact how these duties are 
understood and how fiduciaries actually behave.  
This relatively embracing perspective permits us to speak 
coherently of a “fiduciary enterprise” that is much broader than 
corporate directors and officers. I use the word “enterprise” in the 
sense of a broad collective undertaking,3 including the legal, 
economic, institutional, professional, political, social, cultural, 
and moral frameworks that collectively articulate, translate, and 
enforce fiduciary norms and rules in various settings. In Johnson 
and Millon’s work, this has most prominently taken the form of a 
comprehensive exploration of a much wider range of relevant 
                                                                                                     
 1. See infra note 36–38 (describing their recognition as prominent 
proponents of a broader conception of corporate purpose). 
 2. See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND 
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 284 (5th ed. 2016) (styling the 
issue of corporate purpose as amounting to the question, “[t]o whom do directors 
owe loyalty?”). Note, however, that in certain circumstances loyalty could be 
said to be owed to an abstract purpose, and that certain theories of business 
corporations are arguably amenable to such characterization. See Paul B. Miller 
& Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 523–27, 
537–39 (2015).  
 3. See Enterprise n., 1.a, 3. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE 
(including “an undertaking” or “[t]he action of taking in hand; management, 
superintendence”).  
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actors, all of whom play important roles in the articulation of 
these duties and their translation into concrete behaviors in 
corporate life, and all of whom ought to be held accountable for 
their impacts (if only indirectly in some instances, through 
recognition of their impacts).  
This contribution to a symposium edition of the Washington 
and Lee Law Review, honoring Johnson and Millon’s 
contributions to the field of corporate law, briefly sketches the 
contours of this broader “fiduciary enterprise” of corporate law 
and governance and identifies some of the underlying lessons and 
challenges that this perspective reveals—for scholars, 
practitioners, lawmakers, and judges alike. With respect to the 
institutional dimensions of fiduciary law and the equitable 
framework and orientation of corporate law, this Article places 
greater emphasis on some of Johnson’s recent work. With respect 
to corporate purpose, then, and how various legal and market 
forces impact the way we conceptualize the legitimate aims of 
corporate decision-making, this Article places greater emphasis 
on some of Millon’s recent work. It should be borne in mind, 
however, that there is nothing inevitable about these choices; 
while I believe that these respective contributions illuminate the 
fiduciary enterprise of corporate law in peculiarly powerful ways, 
both Johnson and Millon have each written on these various 
subjects throughout their careers.  
II. Fiduciary Duties and Corporate Law’s Fiduciary Enterprise 
When we speak in holistic terms of corporate law reflecting 
and depending upon a broader “fiduciary enterprise,” who are we 
talking about, specifically? Some of the relevant actors are 
straightforwardly associated with this topic, while others are less 
obviously so. Clearly the fiduciary enterprise of corporate law 
must begin with the board of directors who, according to the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s archetypal statement in its 1939 Guth 
v. Loft, Inc.4 opinion, are “technically not trustees,” yet are said to 
“stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its 
                                                                                                     
 4. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). 
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stockholders,” requiring that they “not only 
affirmatively . . . protect the interests of the corporation,” but also 
“refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the 
corporation.”5 The court’s formulation in Guth clearly reflects the 
traditional aim of insulating “trust and confidence” against the 
abuse of discretionary power,6 and suggests both a negative and 
affirmative thrust to the duty of loyalty—not merely avoiding 
conflicts of interest and clear abuses of their authority, but also 
affirmatively pursuing the corporation’s best interests, a point 
that Johnson has emphasized of fiduciary duties generally.7 This 
formulation is also noteworthy for its open-ended nature. The 
duty of loyalty described in Guth is said to be owed to “the 
corporation and its stockholders” simultaneously (creating an 
ambiguity regarding ultimate aims to which we will return to 
shortly), and the “occasions” for its application are recognized to 
be “many and varied,” defying any “hard and fast rule”—
presumably reflecting the “profound knowledge of human 
characteristics and motives” that the court identifies as 
prompting its creation.8  
In addition to the board of directors, the fiduciary enterprise 
also straightforwardly includes the remaining categories of actors 
widely understood to occupy fiduciary roles in the corporation. 
While shareholders generally are not fiduciaries, a shareholder 
who “owns a majority interest in or exercises control over the 
business affairs of the corporation” will indeed owe fiduciary 
duties to the corporation and the minority shareholders.9 This 
                                                                                                     
 5. Id. at 510. 
 6. Id.  
 7. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse 
in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 27, 38–41, 61–72 (2003) (advocating the 
concept of “due loyalty” to underscore “the affirmative thrust of loyalty”). For an 
argument that the “good faith” concept, as employed in corporate law, effectively 
represents an affirmative aspect of the duty of loyalty, see generally Christopher 
M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director 
Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131 (2006); see also 
Andrew S. Gold, Purposive Loyalty, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 881 (2017) (building 
on Johnson’s argument, while distinguishing between advancing a corporation’s 
“purposes” and advancing that corporation’s “best interests”).  
 8. Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.  
 9. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 
1987). 
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generally becomes significant in conflict transactions and sales of 
control, and the source of this duty generally builds upon the 
foregoing logic, in so far as fiduciary obligations are effectively 
imposed on the party who can actually exert discretionary control 
over the corporation’s business and affairs.10 
Officers, on the other hand, may occupy a different sort of 
fiduciary posture. The Guth formulation of fiduciary loyalty 
applied by its terms to officers as well,11 to be sure, but Johnson 
and Millon have together argued that the basis for applying 
fiduciary duties to officers is their status as agents.12 This is an 
underappreciated point that has important implications because 
it suggests, as they argue in a co-authored article, that “courts 
can and should scrutinize officer conduct more closely than they 
now review director performance.”13  
In sketching out the reach and consequences of fiduciary 
duties in the corporate governance context, the survey of relevant 
actors often stops here, with the parties to whom such duties 
apply. But Johnson and Millon have shown no inclination to let 
the rest of us off the hook so easily. So in this broadly conceived 
fiduciary enterprise of corporate law, who are the other actors 
who, individually and collectively, imbue fiduciary concepts with 
content and condition how the foregoing corporate actors actually 
understand and apply those concepts? Phrasing the matter in 
                                                                                                     
 10. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719 (Del. 1971) 
(“Sinclair nominates all members of Sinven’s board of directors. The Chancellor 
found . . . that the directors were not independent of Sinclair. Almost without 
exception, they were officers, directors, or employees of corporations in the 
Sinclair complex. By reason of Sinclair’s domination . . . Sinclair owed Sinven a 
fiduciary duty.”); see also ROBERT A. RAGAZZO & FRANCES S. FENDLER, CLOSELY 
HELD BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 548–49 (2d ed. 
2012).  
 11. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“Corporate officers 
and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to 
further their private interests. While technically not trustees, they stand in a 
fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders.”).  
 12. See generally Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why 
Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005).  
 13. Id. at 1603. For an in-depth discussion of Johnson and Millon’s 
argument regarding officers’ fiduciary duties flowing from their status as 
corporate agents, see Deborah A. DeMott, Corporate Officers as Agents, 74 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 847 (2017).  
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this way, one might be tempted to jump straight to public 
officials, and public actors do in fact loom large (as discussed 
below).14 However, there are others who, although less obvious, 
are nevertheless highly consequential in conditioning how 
various categories of actors understand and deploy fiduciary 
concepts—corporate law professors. As Johnson emphasized in a 
provocative 2002 article titled The Social Responsibility of 
Corporate Law Professors, business people are advised by 
corporate lawyers and “[t]he people who introduce them to the 
language of corporate law are law professors.”15 This leads 
Johnson to ask, quite fairly, whether the academy itself has done 
enough to give students a thorough and textured understanding 
of concepts like “care,” “loyalty,” and “good faith” in their 
“significant social, literary, and moral meaning outside corporate 
law discourse,” or whether corporate law professors have 
pedagogically defaulted to an atomistic, bargain-based, 
contractarian conception of corporate relations,16 effectively 
sowing the seeds for future corporate policies and behaviors that 
many in the academy profess to disfavor.17 As Johnson sums it up 
in another article on the subject, “[w]rongheaded ideas picked up 
in law school can critically shape how lawyers discharge their all-
important role as legal counselors to business people.”18  
                                                                                                     
 14. See infra notes 19–34 and accompanying text (discussing the respective 
roles of Delaware’s legislature and judiciary). 
 15. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Social Responsibility of Corporate Law 
Professors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1483, 1493 (2002). 
 16. Id. at 1490.  
 17. See id. at 1487–90 (“How can we expect [students] to have, or reflect on 
whether they might desire, an alternative conception of corporate relations if we 
do not provide any?”).  
 18. Lyman Johnson, Corporate Law Professors as Gatekeepers, 6 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 447, 447 (2009); see also David Millon, Shareholder Primacy in the 
Classroom After the Financial Crisis, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 191, 193–95 (2013): 
Given the widespread endorsement of the shareholder primacy idea 
in the academic and business arenas, it seems to me important that 
we law teachers do what we can to disabuse students of the 
assumption that corporate law requires that corporate activity 
prioritize shareholder interests. . . . One way to do this is to point out 
in the business organizations courses the fallacy of the view that 
shareholder primacy is a legal doctrine. . . . As corporate law 
teachers, our powers are limited but we can at least do our best to 
avoid perpetuating facile assumptions about shareholder primacy. 
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These foundational dynamics perhaps loom even larger with 
those who go on to practice in Delaware—not merely due to 
Delaware’s significance in corporate law,19 but also because of the 
direct role that the practicing bar plays in drafting Delaware’s 
corporate statute, the Delaware General Corporation Law 
(DGCL). As one Delaware corporate lawyer has described it, the 
DGCL “is the great beneficiary of an unwritten compact between 
the bar and the state legislature,” under which “the legislature 
will call upon the expertise of the Corporation Law Section of the 
Delaware Bar Association to recommend, review, and draft 
almost all amendments to the statute.”20 
At the same time, then, the training of Delaware’s lawyers 
will naturally affect their inputs into the judicial process, in the 
form of the arguments that they develop and present to 
Delaware’s courts.21 And this, of course, is where the rubber truly 
meets the road in terms of the development of corporate fiduciary 
duties—the Delaware Court of Chancery. Many who do not study 
or practice corporate law are surprised to learn that corporate 
litigation in Delaware is heard in a true court of equity22—and 
here we can begin to perceive the more concrete institutional 
dimensions of the fiduciary enterprise of corporate law. Under 
Delaware’s constitution, the Court of Chancery has general 
equity jurisdiction that (in the Supreme Court’s words) “is 
defined as all the general equity jurisdiction of the High Court of 
Chancery of Great Britain as it existed prior to the separation of 
                                                                                                     
 19. See About Agency, DELAWARE DEP’T ST., DIVISION CORPS., 
http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited May 2, 2017) 
(“The State of Delaware is a leading domicile for U.S. and international 
corporations. More than 1,000,000 business entities have made Delaware their 
legal home. More than 66% of all publicly-traded companies in the United 
States including 66% of the Fortune 500 have chosen Delaware as their legal 
home.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 20. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 4 (2007).  
 21. Cf. id. at 1, 5–6 (observing that “Delaware cases are studied in almost 
every corporations course” in the United States and describing the experience of 
“out-of-town lawyers making their first appearance in Chancery”). 
 22. See Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, DELAWARE COURTS, 
http://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/jurisdiction.aspx (last visited May 2, 2017) 
(explaining that the “Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to hear and determine 
all matters and causes in equity”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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the colonies,” generally keyed to the 1792 vesting of authority in 
the court, to the extent that there is no adequate remedy at law.23 
As Johnson has emphasized, “[a] key creation of judge-made 
equity is the concept of fiduciary duties,” and on both conceptual 
levels—equity writ large, and fiduciary duties in particular—
Delaware corporate law, and the Court of Chancery itself, are 
accordingly rooted in very deep legal, intellectual, and moral 
traditions. 24 
Aristotle himself observed the core problem that “all law is 
universal but about some things it is not possible to make a 
universal statement which shall be correct”—prompting the 
emergence of equity as a corrective.25 “When the law speaks 
universally, then, and a case arises which is not covered by the 
universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us 
and has erred by over-simplicity, to correct the omission. . . . And 
this is the nature of the equitable.”26 Legal historians might 
immediately perceive resonances in old English decisions such as 
The Earl of Oxford’s Case,27 where Lord Chancellor Ellesmere 
declared in 1615 that “[t]he Cause why there is a Chancery is, for 
that Mens Actions are so divers and infinite, That it is impossible 
to make any general Law which may aptly meet with every 
particular Act”—the Chancellor’s role, then, being “to correct 
Mens Consciences for Frauds, Breach of Trusts, Wrongs and 
Oppressions, of what Nature soever they be.”28 Delaware 
corporate lawyers may in turn perceive resonances of the 
                                                                                                     
 23. DuPont v. DuPont, 85 A.2d 724, 727–29 (Del. 1951). For additional 
background on the history of the Court of Chancery and the scope of its equity 
jurisdiction, see Del. Const. art. IV, §§ 10, 17 (2017); BLACK, supra note 20, at 5; 
Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 703, 
716–18 (2011); William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery—1792–1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 825–30 
(1993); Delaware Judiciary, supra note 22.  
 24. Johnson, supra note 23, at 711.  
 25. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 133 (David Ross trans., 1980).  
 26. Id.  
 27. 21 Eng. Rep. 485 (1615). 
 28. Id. at 486. For additional background on how the “Aristotelian tradition 
of equity” impacted courts of equity, see Henry E. Smith, Equity as Second-
Order Law: The Problem of Opportunism 5–6, 21–22 (Harvard Public Law 
Working Paper No. 15–13, 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2617413. 
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foregoing in Delaware case law—for example, in Schnell v. 
Chris-Craft,29 where the Delaware Supreme Court famously 
declared (much closer to the present) that “inequitable action 
does not become permissible simply because it is legally 
possible.”30  
Consistent with Delaware’s rootedness in the long-standing 
legal, intellectual, and moral traditions of equity, corporate 
fiduciary duties themselves straightforwardly make their way 
from England to Delaware via the Court of Chancery’s 
constitutional jurisdiction. Fiduciary duties were well recognized 
in England as an expression of equity by the eighteenth 
century,31 including in the corporate context. As Lord Chancellor 
Hardwicke declared in a case involving board oversight failures 
and allegations of “a breach of trust, fraud, and mismanagement,”  
 
[n]or will I ever determine that a court of equity cannot lay 
hold of every breach of trust, let the person be guilty of it 
either in a private, or public capacity. The tribunals of this 
kingdom are wisely formed both of courts of law and 
equity . . . and for this reason there can be no injury, but 
there must be a remedy in all or some of them.32  
Accordingly, Delaware’s own Court of Chancery—with 
jurisdiction keyed to this institutional framework and body of 
                                                                                                     
 29. 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971). 
 30. Id. at 439. 
 31. See Winchester (Bishop of) v. Knight, 24 Eng. Rep. 447, 448 (1717) 
(stating that “[i]t would be a reproach to equity, to say, where a man has taken 
my property . . . and disposed of it in his life-time, and dies, that in this case, I 
must be without a remedy,” and that “it is stronger in this case by reason that 
the tenant is a sort of a fiduciary to the lord”). 
 32. The Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 642, 645 (1742). For 
additional background, see Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law is Equitable, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 261, 264 (Andrew S. Gold & 
Paul B. Miller eds., 2014); Samuel L. Bray, A Student’s Guide to the Meanings of 
“Equity,” OPEN SCIENCE FRAMEWORK (July 20, 2016), https://osf.io/sabev/ (last 
visited May 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Johnson, supra note 23, at 709–10; Lyman Johnson, Enduring Equity in the 
Close Corporation 23–24 (University of St. Thomas Minnesota School of Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10–26, Washington and Lee University 
School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2010–11), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=1717034; Quillen & 
Hanrahan, supra note 23. 
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law—has straightforwardly possessed jurisdiction over corporate 
fiduciary duty cases. Indeed, Delaware’s Chancellor Allen, 
writing in 1987, explained that the Court of Chancery’s 
jurisdiction in such cases flows from the fact that such duties “are 
imposed by equity and are recognized and enforced exclusively by 
a court of equity.”33 And in the corporate context, those equitable 
powers and associated duties have generally trumped contractual 
freedom when they directly collide—notably in the courts’ 
rejection of efforts to contractually “define or limit the directors’ 
fiduciary duties,” or to “prevent . . . directors from carrying out 
their fiduciary duties,” whether at the board’s or the 
shareholders’ behest.34 
III. Corporate Purpose: Loyalty to Whom? 
Consistent with this broad view of the contours of the 
fiduciary enterprise as a superstructure for corporate law, 
encompassing a wide range of private and public actors 
contributing to the life of that enterprise in various ways, 
Johnson and Millon have taken a similarly expansive approach to 
the issue of corporate purpose—that is, the issue of whose 
interests ought to guide corporate decision-making. As noted 
above, phrased in fiduciary terminology, the question is 
essentially “loyalty to whom?”35—and Johnson and Millon 
together have long been recognized as prominent proponents of a 
conception of corporate purpose that reaches well beyond the 
shareholders alone, affording boards meaningful discretion to 
show regard for the interests of non-shareholders in a wide range 
                                                                                                     
 33. McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 604 (Del. Ch. 1987).  
 34. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del. 
1994); see also CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 
238–40 (Del. 2008) (explaining that “[t]his Court has previously invalidated 
contracts that would require a board to act or not act” in a manner limiting its 
fiduciary duties, and similarly invalidating “a binding bylaw that the 
shareholders seek to impose involuntarily on the directors in the specific area of 
election expense reimbursement”). 
 35. See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 2, at 284 (styling the issue of 
corporate purpose as amounting to the question, “[t]o whom do directors owe 
loyalty?”). 
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of circumstances. This approach has loomed largest in their 
scholarship on legal responses to hostile takeovers,36 which pit 
premium-seeking shareholders diametrically against the stability 
interests of employees, creditors, local communities, and of course 
management.37 In fact, by the mid-1990s one finds references in 
the corporate law literature to “the Washington and Lee School of 
corporate jurisprudence”—characterized by a “brilliant 
intellectual history of legal theorizing about the corporation 
                                                                                                     
 36. Johnson and Millon made numerous contributions in this area during 
the height of the takeover boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Co-authored 
pieces include Lyman Johnson & David Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 BUS. 
LAW. 2105 (1990); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Takeovers and 
Corporate Law: Who’s in Control?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1177 (1993); Lyman 
Johnson & David Millon, Does the Williams Act Preempt State Common Law in 
Hostile Takeovers?, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 339 (1989); Lyman Johnson & David 
Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862 (1989); Lyman 
Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 846 (1989). Individually authored pieces include Lyman Johnson, 
Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are They For?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 781 (1986); Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of 
Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865 (1990); Lyman Johnson, 
The Eventual Clash Between Judicial and Legislative Notions of Target 
Management Conduct, 14 J. CORP. L. 35 (1988); Lyman Johnson, Individual and 
Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215 
(1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) and ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD 
SOCIETY (1991)); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Making (Corporate) Law in a Skeptical 
World, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161 (1992); Lyman Johnson, Sovereignty Over 
Corporate Stock, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 485 (1991); Lyman Johnson, State Takeover 
Statutes: Constitutionality, Community, and Heresy, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1051 (1988); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 
(1991); David Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law?, 45 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 903 (1988); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 201 (1990). 
 37. See generally CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 
COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER 36–
53 (2013). The core conflict that characterizes hostile takeovers can arise in any 
corporate governance system with widely dispersed shareholdings, and 
otherwise similar common-law legal systems have addressed this conflict in 
differing ways. Id. The U.S. approach shows greater regard for non-
shareholders’ interests, a response that I have argued elsewhere reflects the 
weakness of the U.S. social safety net and consequent political pressures 
brought to bear upon the corporate governance system in the period of perceived 
crisis following the advent of hostile takeovers in the 1980s. See generally id.  
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and . . . its powerful critique of conservative arguments against 
managerial responsiveness to nonshareholder interests.”38 
Johnson and Millon arrived in legal academia just as these 
developments were starting to re-shape corporate law and 
governance in fundamental ways, and they wrote extensively on 
these topics for many years, both individually and together.39 To 
be sure, there is substantial disagreement across the academy—
even among scholars who normatively favor such views—
regarding whether shareholder-oriented approaches or so-called 
“communitarian” or “progressive” approaches better describe the 
law, particularly in Delaware.40 For present purposes, however, I 
                                                                                                     
 38. William H. Simon, What Difference Does It Make Whether Corporate 
Managers Have Public Responsibilities?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1697, 1697 
(1993); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative 
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL 
L. REV. 856, 857 (1997) (explaining that “the principal resistance” to 
law-and-economics conceptions of the corporation was “currently [being] offered 
by a group of relatively young academics loosely centered around the corporate 
law faculties of the Washington & Lee and George Washington law schools”).  
 39. Johnson arrived in 1985 and Millon arrived in 1986. Lyman P.Q. 
Johnson, WASH. & LEE SCH. OF L., https://law2.wlu.edu/faculty/profiledetail.asp 
?id=23 (last visited May 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); David Millon, WASH. & LEE SCH. OF L., 
http://law2.wlu.edu/faculty/profiledetail.asp?id=33 (last visited Apr. 4, 2017) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 40. Compare, e.g., BRUNER, supra note 37, at 36–65 (arguing that “U.S. 
shareholders possess surprisingly limited capacity to intervene in corporate 
affairs, and their interests are not prioritized with anything approaching the 
clarity and consistency enjoyed by their U.K. counterparts”); LYNN STOUT, THE 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 24–32 (2012) (arguing that “[t]here is no solid legal 
support for the claim that directors and executives . . . have an enforceable legal 
duty to maximize shareholder wealth”); Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring 
Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1408–27 (2008) (arguing 
that corporate law is “ambivalent regarding its power constituencies, its 
beneficiaries, and its relationship to the social good”); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing 
Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 763–76 (2005) 
(arguing that “the law has never barred corporations from sacrificing corporate 
profits to further public interest goals that are not required by law”); Johnson, 
The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 
supra note 36, at 898–903, 909–17 (describing the tension between 
“management discretion and shareholder primacy”); David Millon, Radical 
Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1014, 1022–25, 1043–44 
(2013) (describing corporate law’s traditional “assignment of broad discretion to 
management and its weak commitment to accountability to shareholders”), with 
KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND 
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remain focused on the expansiveness of Johnson and Millon’s 
investigation of the various factors that have fueled the 
increasingly widespread perception that corporate law and 
governance ought to focus narrowly on the shareholders’ 
interests. This involves an account not solely of law and 
regulation, but also of academia, the market, and society. On this 
score I will focus particular on some of Millon’s more recent work 
in that vein.  
As Johnson and Millon both recognized early on in their 
takeover scholarship, there is a core ambiguity in the Guth 
formulation of the duty of loyalty, said to be owed to “the 
corporation and its stockholders” simultaneously—a formulation 
that, as Johnson suggested in a 1990 article, essentially 
“bracketed” the debate about whether the corporation is best 
conceptualized as an entity, or rather as an aggregation of 
individuals.41 This debate did not require doctrinal resolution as a 
practical matter for most of the twentieth century due to 
widespread prosperity and correlatively limited conflict among 
corporate constituencies.42 As Millon likewise observed the same 
year, “the interests of the corporation and of its shareholders 
                                                                                                     
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 22 (2006) (arguing that those describing corporate 
law as embracing “shareholder supremacy” are, in terms of “pure 
description, . . . more right than wrong”); Kent Greenfield, Sticking the Landing: 
Making the Most of the ‘Stakeholder Moment,’ 26 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 147, 147–48 
(2015) (reporting “significant pushback against the shareholder primacy norm” 
while arguing that “accounts of [its] imminent death . . . are exaggerated”); Leo 
E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding 
of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 763 (2015) (expressing 
sympathy toward “center-left” views while arguing that “stockholder welfare [is] 
the sole end of corporate governance” under Delaware law); David G. Yosifon, 
The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 228 (2013) 
(identifying with “progressive” scholars normatively while arguing that 
Delaware law embraces “shareholder primacy”).  
 41. See Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate 
Life and Corporate Law, supra note 36, at 900 n.133 (“Asserting that directors 
owe duties to stockholders acknowledges the corporation as an aggregation of 
individual actors, and emphasizing duties to the corporation expresses that 
corporations are entities separate and distinct from individual participants.”). 
 42. See id. (“Rather than seek to resolve a theoretical debate that could not 
be, and did not need to be, resolved at the doctrinal level . . . pretakeover legal 
doctrine in the fiduciary area simply equivocated.”). 
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have been assumed to be at least congruent,” but “[s]ince the 
advent of hostile takeovers, this assumed identity of interest has 
no longer been tenable.”43 In a substantial body of work—some 
written individually, and some together—Johnson and Millon 
argued forcefully that the legal response to hostile takeovers 
revealed a vision of corporate purpose far more expansive than 
shareholder interests alone.44 This was most vividly reflected in 
anti-takeover statutes, but it was also detectable in Delaware 
case law, they argued, where review of takeovers broke strongly 
in favor of board discretion to focus on the corporation’s long-term 
sustainability, with so-called “Revlon duties”—requiring focus on 
maximizing the price received by shareholders—applying only in 
a narrow range of final-period scenarios, which themselves would 
arise only if the board so decided.45 
There is no gainsaying the extraordinary power of 
shareholder-centrism as a dominant norm in corporate 
governance,46 however, and some of Millon’s recent work has 
                                                                                                     
 43. Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note 36, at 255. Hostile 
takeovers and the stark divergence of interests revealed by these transactions 
vividly reflect corporate law’s ambivalence regarding shareholders. See generally 
Bruner, supra note 40, at 1415–18; see also Miller & Gold, supra note 2, at 538–
39, 582–83 (characterizing corporate law’s apparent ambivalence as 
simultaneous pursuit of loyalty to shareholders and loyalty to abstract 
purposes).  
 44. See supra note 36 (cataloguing their scholarship in this area). 
 45. Id.; see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 
(Del. 1985) (permitting target boards to assess effects on “the corporate 
enterprise,” including “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders”); 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986) (holding that once “the break-up of the company was inevitable,” the 
board’s duty “changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to 
the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit”); 
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43–44 (Del. 1994) 
(applying Revlon duties in the context of “a sale of control”); Paramount 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149–54 (Del. 1990) (“The fiduciary 
duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time frame for 
achievement of corporate goals. . . . Directors are not obliged to abandon a 
deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless 
there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.”).  
 46. Cf. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 2, at 284–85 (characterizing 
“loyalty to equity investors” as “an important theme of U.S. corporate law,” 
while adding that “shareholder priority more closely resembles a deep but 
implicit value in American corporate law than a legal rule in any normal 
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proven particularly illuminating as to its origins and the nature 
of its peculiar force. Specifically, Millon has dug deeply into the 
range of structures that condition what we expect of various 
market actors and impact how they choose to behave. In an 
important recent article Millon distinguishes a more “radical” 
variant of shareholder primacy that has taken hold over recent 
decades, which tends to characterize boards of directors as mere 
agents of the shareholders with little legitimate discretion to 
focus on the long-term.47 The story of radical shareholder 
primacy’s origins proves to be equal parts law, economics (of a 
sort), sociology, and cultural history. In addition to charting the 
ascendance of the “nexus of contracts” view of the corporation, 
rooted in Chicago-school “law and economics,” he traces how 
those ideas made their way—again, via the academy, and figures 
well positioned to amplify those ideas in the business press—to 
those who ultimately counsel corporate managers and major 
investors.48 Millon concludes, with considerable justification, that 
“[r]adical shareholder primacy in the law schools is probably part 
of a larger ideological, economic, and socio-political phenomenon 
that now shapes and legitimates business practice in powerful 
ways. That complex but hugely important story has yet to be 
told.”49 
In a similarly holistic manner, Millon has explored various 
market constraints driving major institutions—by far the most 
consequential actors in today’s capital markets50—to focus 
                                                                                                     
sense”).  
 47. See Millon, supra note 40, at 1018–21. 
 48. See generally id. at 1025–42; see also Millon, supra note 18, at 191–92 
(describing how shareholder primacy is commonly accepted by legal and 
business scholars, as well as “business leaders, investors, politicians, and 
government regulators”). 
 49. Millon, supra note 40, at 1042; see also Millon, supra note 18, at 195 
(arguing that students “need to understand that non-legal values and 
incentives—including political commitment, social norms, compensation 
arrangements, pressure from institutional shareholders, to name a few—can 
lead corporate management to prioritize current share price maximization over 
long-term strategic investment and cultivation of the well-being of key 
nonshareholder constituencies”).  
 50. See David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 911, 913 (2013) (observing that institutions “own approximately three-
fourths of the 1,000 largest U.S. corporations and around 70% of the shares of 
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intently on short-term stock price performance, and to pressure 
corporate management to do the same. In another recent piece he 
dissects the enormous pressures that institutions face to deliver 
short-term returns—for example, the fact that “[t]o meet their 
current obligations, public pension funds have historically 
assumed an annual rate of return of 8%, give or take a half point 
depending on the plan.”51 Obviously most public pensions have 
not been able to achieve that sort of return following the crisis, 
leading them to “focus on short-term stock price performance” 
and increasingly depend upon trading strategies involving “high 
turnover rates”—realities hardly compatible with the old-school 
ideal of patient capital supporting management in the pursuit of 
sustainable long-term growth.52 Similar market pressures impact 
other types of institutions, and of course legal pressures 
emanating from unexpected sources can (ironically) reinforce 
these tendencies—including prudent investor standards 
applicable to pensions under federal labor law and state law,53 
which have been interpreted to require intense focus on 
generating returns for beneficiaries and even pro-active 
engagement in activism to force management to behave 
accordingly.54  
IV. Contractualism and the Fiduciary Enterprise 
The holistic approaches that Johnson and Millon have taken 
in their exploration of the fiduciary superstructure of corporate 
law and their related exploration of corporate purpose—including 
this wide-ranging discussion of the various pressures toward a 
                                                                                                     
all U.S. corporations”).  
 51. Id. at 931. 
 52. Id. at 930–32; see also Millon, supra note 18, at 192 (“Commitment to 
short-term shareholder value has significant negative implications for the 
long-term viability of large corporations . . . .”). 
 53. See Millon, supra note 50, at 938–39. 
 54. For an in-depth examination of pressures toward short-term-oriented 
shareholder-centrism emerging from such bodies of law, see generally 
Christopher M. Bruner, Center-Left Politics and Corporate Governance: What Is 
the “Progressive” Agenda?, 2018 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2917253.  
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narrow focus on shareholders—highlight fundamental 
dimensions of the evolving landscape for business organizations 
law. This section explores some important lessons and challenges 
that this perspective reveals.  
Doctrinally, the most significant innovations in this regard 
have arisen in the area of unincorporated entities—notably the 
advent of limited liability companies (LLCs)—and in this area 
Delaware, in particular, has chosen to permit total elimination of 
fiduciary duties that would otherwise be owed by those managing 
the business.55 In such a case, we are quite literally left with a 
purely contractual business arrangement, for which the baseline 
standard of conduct is reduced to the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing.56 Indeed, the legislative intent to permit a 
fundamentally contractual relationship is underscored by an 
unequivocal “policy . . . to give maximum effect to the principle of 
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of partnership [or 
LLC] agreements.”57  
It is widely assumed in the literature that contract provides a 
clearer conceptual framework for business organizations, and 
accordingly ought to be preferred over messy, equitable gap-
fillers.58 However, the fuller picture of the fiduciary enterprise 
                                                                                                     
 55. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2017) (“To the extent that . . . a 
member or manager or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to 
[an LLC] or to another member or manager . . . the member’s or manager’s or 
other person’s duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions 
in the [LLC] agreement . . . .”). 
 56. See id. (providing that “the [LLC] agreement may not eliminate the 
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing”).  
 57. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-103(a), (b)(3), (d), (f) (2017); see also DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(c)-(d), (f) (2017) (expressing the same policy); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b)–(c), (e) (2017) (expressing the same policy). For a 
comparative discussion of permissible contractual limitation of fiduciary duties 
in the United States and the United Kingdom, see Christopher M. Bruner, 
Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities in U.S. and U.K. Business 
Entities, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW (Gordon Smith & Andrew 
Gold eds., Edward Elgar, forthcoming 2017).  
 58. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 90 (1991) (“If contracts can be written in enough 
detail, there is no need for ‘fiduciary’ duties as well.”); see also Larry E. Ribstein, 
Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 
541–50 (1997) (evaluating how the costs and benefits of fiduciary duties may 
vary depending on the circumstances).  
808 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 791 (2017) 
that Johnson and Millon have sketched out for us suggests that 
the matter is not so simple as that. The shift from a more 
relational conception of governance to a more contractual 
conception of governance implicates not just legal rules, but the 
entire social and institutional framework that surrounds and 
applies fiduciary norms and rules.  
Johnson, for example, has argued forcefully that the 
constitutional basis of the Delaware Court of Chancery’s equity 
jurisdiction literally precludes the legislature from statutorily 
barring Chancery judges from scrutinizing fiduciary duty 
waivers.59 As he pithily expresses the point, “[t]he judges of the 
Chancery Court may rue this discretion, or seek in various ways 
to shun it or corral it. What they cannot do is deny they continue 
to possess it.”60 Ultimately, Johnson challenges us to think harder 
about whether there is a broader wisdom to the constitutional 
embeddedness of the Court of Chancery’s equity jurisdiction—for 
example, the “scant protection” offered by the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, and the consequent dangers facing 
unsophisticated parties not plausibly capable of anticipating all 
the ways in which they might be abused, let alone negotiating 
effective contractual protections.61  
Relatedly, we might reasonably query what it means to alter 
the Court of Chancery itself, as arguably occurs in an incremental 
fashion as a consequence of these same developments. As 
discussed above, the Court of Chancery’s jurisdiction over 
corporate governance relationships has long been considered a 
matter of course, flowing directly as it does from the equitable 
                                                                                                     
 59. See generally Johnson, supra note 23. 
 60. Id. at 720. 
 61. See id.at 723–24 (“Why try to clumsily retool an untried concept when 
one designed specifically for the task at hand—fiduciary duty—already exists? 
Moreover, recent decisional law demonstrates that there is little robustness to 
the doctrine and that it affords scant protection.”). It has been argued more 
generally that equity emerged to provide “a safety valve to deal with the 
problem of opportunism that arises where the simple ex ante structures of the 
common law invite efforts at manipulation by the sophisticated and 
unscrupulous.” See Henry E. Smith, The Equitable Dimension of Contract, 45 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 897, 903–11 (2012); see also generally Smith, supra note 28 
(similarly characterizing equity as “second-order law” aimed at responding to 
opportunistic behavior). 
THE FIDUCIARY ENTERPRISE OF CORPORATE LAW 809 
roots of fiduciary duties.62 Chancellor Allen, in the opinion quoted 
above, explained that this is why “Chancery’s traditional 
jurisdiction over corporate officers and directors” has applied 
“without regard to the remedy sought.”63 So how, then, do we 
conceptualize Chancery’s role in governance-related disputes 
arising in the unincorporated entity context where—per the 
statutes and the express legislative policy in favor of maximum 
freedom of contract—such duties might not even apply? The 
general jurisdictional provision of the corporate statute does not 
bother to address such matters, presumably because (as 
Chancellor Allen’s observation suggests) there is no need to do 
so.64 Yet its counterpart in the LLC statute expressly clarifies 
that the Court of Chancery can hear actions involving “the duties, 
obligations or liabilities” among members and managers65—
presumably reflecting the fact that, if fiduciary duties are 
removed from the equation, it is not entirely obvious that the 
Court of Chancery has any business here. This suggests, if subtly, 
that unincorporated entities heavily leaning on contract as their 
organizing principle impact not just the mores of governance 
among private actors, but also the larger social and institutional 
framework that their relations inhabit.  
The larger public impacts of styling unincorporated entities 
as solely or primarily contractual in nature are readily apparent 
in recent Delaware case law tackling such matters directly. In his 
In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC66 opinion in 2015, Vice Chancellor 
Laster found that an assignee of an LLC membership interest 
had equitable standing to seek dissolution, even though there 
was plainly no statutory or contractual right for an assignee to do 
                                                                                                     
 62. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (describing how the 
Court of Chancery’s jurisdiction over corporate fiduciary duty cases arises from 
the court’s equitable jurisdiction).  
 63. McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 604 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
 64. Cf. id. (“The duties they owe to shareholders . . . are imposed by equity 
and are recognized and enforced exclusively by a court of equity.”). 
 65. Compare 8 DEL. C. § 111 (2017) (addressing corporations), with 6 DEL. 
C. § 18-111 (2017) (addressing LLCs); see also 6 DEL. C. § 15-122 (2017) 
(addressing general partnerships); 6 DEL. C. § 17-111 (2017) (addressing limited 
partnerships).  
 66. 114 A.3d 592 (Del. Ch. 2015). 
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so.67 Both sides had apparently believed that a transfer of full 
membership had been accomplished, and Vice Chancellor Laster’s 
response to the argument that Section 18-802 of Delaware’s LLC 
act represents “the exclusive extra-contractual method of 
dissolving an LLC”68 underscores the degree to which assessing 
the extent of the LLC’s inherent contractualism remains bound 
up with what Vice Chancellor Laster calls “the ‘complete system’ 
of equity that [the Chancery] court inherited and administers,”69 
and the state’s continuing political and social interest in business 
entities that deploy publicly created powers. Vice Chancellor 
Laster writes that if the statute had purported to displace the 
Court of Chancery’s “traditional equitable jurisdiction” to order 
dissolution, that “would raise serious constitutional questions” (a 
proposition for which he cites Johnson’s work),70 and further 
states that parties’ ability to contractually waive the right to 
statutory dissolution “does not extend to a party’s standing to 
seek dissolution in equity.”71 He then ties the issue of 
contractualism directly to the Court of Chancery’s own status and 
role: 
To my mind, when a sovereign makes available an entity with 
attributes that contracting parties cannot grant themselves by 
agreement, the entity is not purely contractual. Because the 
entity has taken advantage of benefits that the sovereign has 
provided, the sovereign retains an interest in that entity. That 
interest in turn calls for preserving the ability of the 
sovereign’s courts to oversee and, if necessary, dissolve the 
entity. Put more directly, an LLC agreement is not an 
exclusively private contract among its members precisely 
because the LLC has powers that only the State of Delaware 
can confer. . . . Just as LLCs are not purely private entities, 
dissolution is not a purely private affair. . . . Because an LLC 
takes advantage of benefits that the State of Delaware 
provides, and because dissolution is not an exclusively private 
matter, the State of Delaware retains an interest in having the 
                                                                                                     
 67. See id. at 592, 594, 597, 601. 
 68. Id. at 595–97. 
 69. Id. at 602. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 605.  
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Court of Chancery available, when equity demands, to hear a 
petition to dissolve an LLC. . . .72 
Vice Chancellor Laster’s analysis vividly emphasizes the 
“complete system” of equity to which he draws attention in the 
opinion, and reveals this issue of the LLC’s degree of 
contractualism to be inherently bound up with a much larger set 
of political, social, and institutional dynamics, involving a high 
degree of identity-relevance for the Court of Chancery itself.73 
Simply put, the LLC’s degree of contractualism cannot be 
assessed in isolation from broader political, social, and 
institutional dynamics; the subject is inherently public.  
V. Conclusion 
The stubborn persistence of equity and fiduciary duties, 
notwithstanding the apparent victory of contractualism reflected 
in the unincorporated entity statutes, suggests that the law of 
business organizations simply cannot be fully specified ex ante. 
As Lord Chancellor Ellesmere back in the seventeenth century 
might have put it, our “[a]ctions are so divers and infinite”74 that 
a flexible, equitable framework becomes unavoidable; we could 
dismantle it, but would only end up reinventing it.75 This is a 
critical aspect of the progressive response to contractualism—
contractualists fundamentally believe that governance 
arrangements are amenable to a high degree of ex ante 
specification, and progressives fundamentally do not.76  
                                                                                                     
 72. Id. at 605–06.  
 73. See id. at 602 (“It is the ‘complete system’ of equity that this court 
inherited and administers, not the temporally specific subject matter of 
eighteenth century cases.”). 
 74. The Earl of Oxford’s Case, 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 486 (1615).  
 75. Cf. Smith, supra note 61, at 903–11 (characterizing equity as an 
essential “safety valve” to respond to opportunistic behavior). 
 76. See, e.g., David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: 
Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 7–9 
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (“Skepticism toward contractarian assumptions 
about the technological feasibility of adequate self-protection through contract is 
an important aspect of the communitarian stance.”). It has been argued more 
generally that, in overstating the degree to which risks can be assessed ex ante, 
law and economics scholarship effectively “sweeps the problem of the 
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There is arguably no more consequential issue in corporate 
law and governance than this, and Johnson and Millon’s work 
challenges us to tackle it fully and forthrightly, recognizing that 
issues of time horizon, corporate purpose, and relational 
paradigm are not simply doctrinal questions. These matters 
reflect an extraordinarily complex netting of vectors that 
emanate not only from various forms of law and regulation, but 
also from a host of economic, institutional, professional, political, 
social, cultural, and moral inputs that shape norms and attitudes 
about how we ought to relate to one another in our economic 
lives. To paraphrase Millon’s conclusion cited above, we have 
barely begun to tell this “hugely important story,”77 let alone to 
grapple with it.  
                                                                                                     
opportunist under the rug” and thereby “assume[s] away the problem equity is 
there to solve.” Smith, supra note 28, at 58, 61–62. 
 77. Cf. Millon, supra note 40, at 1042.  
